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Abstract
Given that both the costs and the benefits of biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures are
subject to spatial variation, considerations of allocational efficiency call for spatially
differentiated compensation payments for such measures. However, when deciding whether to
implement uniform or spatially differentiated compensation payments, the regulator has to
balance the allocational efficiency losses of uniform payments with the disadvantages of
spatially differentiated payments. To help resolve this issue, this paper provides a conceptual
framework that allows the extent of allocational efficiency losses associated with uniform
payments for biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures to be assessed. A simple ecological-
economic model is presented which calculates the efficiency losses associated with uniform
payments for different types of benefit and cost functions.
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1. Introduction
Whereas some endangered species require reserves to survive, others depend on particular
types of human land use. For example, many species in Western Europe can only survive in
agricultural landscapes if farmers carry out biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures
(Hampicke/Roth 2000). One example of such measures is not mowing meadows before a
certain specified date to protect the nests of meadow-birds. However, biodiversity-enhancing
land-use measures are usually costly. Since the political will often exists that land owners and
in particular farmers should not be forced to carry them out, compensation has to be paid
(Bromley/Hodge 1990).
Designing compensation payments for biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures has to take
into account that both the costs and the benefits of such measures are subject to spatial
variation. As well as regional differentiation, differentiation may also be prominent on a much
smaller scale, for instance between plots of land owned by different farms. The possible
reasons for cost differences include differences in soil qualities, opportunity costs for labour,
and the availability of equipment to carry out biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures.
Benefit differentiation may be caused by different habitat quality.
Given the spatial differences in costs and benefits, considerations of allocational efficiency
call for spatially differentiated biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures, and, hence, spatially
differentiated compensation payments. While allocational efficiency may require
compensation payments to vary among regions or even on a farm-by-farm basis, the
administrative costs of such differentiation may be significant, and objections based on equity
or legal concerns may lead to political acceptance problems in implementing such differing
payments. Thus, when deciding whether to implement uniform or spatially differentiated
compensation payments, the regulator has to balance allocational efficiency losses on the one
hand with administrative costs as well as equity and legal concerns on the other.
Allocational efficiency losses may also be prevented by paying compensation for results rather
than measures. Under this approach, for instance, compensation would not be paid to a farmer
for creating a suitable habitat for an endangered plant but only for the actual presence of the
plant on his fields. Although compensation payments for results do not yet play an important
role in conservation policy, they are an option which recently has been increasingly discussed
in various European countries and is being introduced on an experimental basis in for instance
Germany. Such types of payment prevent losses due to spatially inefficient allocation because3
they encourage those farmers to produce the desired ecological effects who can do so at the
least expense. Although avoiding problems of spatially inefficient allocation compensation,
payments for results have other potential disadvantages such as high administrative costs for
verifying whether the ecological results have actually been achieved (e.g. whether an
endangered plant is actually growing) and inefficiencies through positive externalities (e.g. the
seeds of an endangered plant being blown onto a neighbour’s meadows). Furthermore,
farmers may find it difficult to accept such a scheme as payments hinge not only on their own
efforts but also on exogenous influences such as weather conditions. In both types of decision
– spatially homogeneous versus spatially differentiated payments and payments for measures
rather than for results – the regulator has to weigh up the various advantages and
disadvantages of both alternatives, including aspects of spatial allocational efficiency.
The aim of this paper is to increase understanding of spatial allocational efficiency issues with
respect to biodiversity protection and particular regard to the policy instrument of
compensation payments. For this purpose a conceptual framework is developed that allows
the extent of spatial allocational efficiency losses to be evaluated under different
circumstances, i.e. under different cost/benefit structures.
The issue of spatial differentiation in environmental policy instruments came in for much
attention in the 1970s and 1980s, often against the background of regional differences in air
pollution (see e.g. Tietenberg 1978). On a theoretical level, Kolstad (1987) analysed the extent
of efficiency losses with spatially uniform regulation, in principle the same question as tackled
in this paper. Among his findings were that efficiency losses increase when the marginal cost
and benefit functions are steep. However, due to the general shape of the benefit function, the
applicability of his results to biodiversity protection – an issue that has been increasingly
taken up in recent years – is limited.
To focus on biodiversity protection, the ecological benefit function has to be based on
ecological theory. This requires incorporating ecological and economic knowledge into the
evaluation of conservation instruments. So far, only a few studies have explicitly integrated
both ecological and economic knowledge into such an evaluation. Recent work using this
approach includes analyses of the extent to which efficiency improvements can be achieved by
integrating economic costs (land prices) into the selection criteria of conservation sites
compared to an approach that only considers ecological parameters, such as the number of
endangered species (Ando et al. 1998, Polasky et al. 2001). Similarly, Johst et al. (2002)
integrated economic cost data and the results of an ecological model into a numerical4
modelling procedure to determine spatio-temporally efficient compensation payments for
species protection.
On a more general level, Wu and Bogess (1999) show that the specific shape of the ecological
benefit function influences the spatial allocation of conservation funds. For instance, if a
threshold in the ecological benefit function exists (i.e. cumulative effects are present), the
optimum spatial allocation of limited conservation funds is such that funds should be
concentrated in one region in order to exceed the threshold instead of being distributed evenly
among regions. Drechsler and Wätzold (2001) systematically examine how the budget size,
the shape of the cost function and the shape of the benefit function affect the efficient spatial
allocation of conservation funds.
These ecological-economic studies have contributed to our understanding of how best to
spatially allocate conservation funds under different ecological and economic circumstances.
What they have not addressed is the question that for the reasons outlined above spatially
efficient allocation may pose problems, and that in this context it is important to know the
extent to which losses through inefficient allocation may arise. This is the starting point of this
paper, which focuses on the particular problem of allocational efficiency losses through
spatially homogeneous compensation payments.
For this purpose we use a numerical optimisation model. The model’s cost and benefit
functions are briefly explained in Section Two. Section Three describes the model and Section
Four how it was analysed. The results are presented in Section Five and discussed in Section
Six.
2. Benefit and cost functions
In this section, the benefit and cost functions are introduced which form the basis of the
model. Both functions relate the costs and biodiversity benefits to the area that has been
transformed through biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures into land suitable for
conservation.
The benefit functions are taken from Drechsler and Wätzold (2001), where how they are
derived from ecological theory is explained in detail. However, as many readers may not be
familiar with ecological theory, a brief account of their ecological content would not be amiss.
The general derivation of an ecological benefit function poses some problems. Firstly, benefits
from a habitat can be assessed by different criteria. This implies that a number of different5
benefit functions have to be taken into account in order to cover at least part of the possible
range of judgements. Furthermore, each ecosystem is unique to some extent and there is no
detailed common scale to compare their benefits. Nevertheless, ecosystems have to be – and
are – compared for conservation management decisions, and if the focus is on general
properties, common scales do exist which allow different ecosystems to be compared.
One such common property is species richness (i.e. the number of species) and the first
benefit function assumes that the benefit B depends on species richness S on a habitat patch
where S is a function of the size of the habitat area A:
z A S B ⋅ = = α (1)
α represents some positive constant and the exponent, z, ranges from 0.15 to 0.35, depending
on the habitat type and the taxonomic group of the species considered. For instance, z will
differ between mammals and reptiles.
Another possible measure of ecosystem benefit is to focus on key stone or umbrella species.
Key stone species may be considered more ‘valuable’ than others in terms of conservation
because their activities govern the well-being of other species. Umbrella species demand high
habitat quality, so if theses species are conserved, others that are less demanding will be
conserved as well.
While the ‘performance’ of individual species in a habitat and their dependence on habitat
area may hinge on many details, some general rules still exist. The expected lifetime T of a
population is a universal measure of population viability (persistence and probability of
survival) and is related to the carrying capacity of its habitat. The carrying capacity expresses
the maximum number of individuals the habitat can sustain under optimum conditions and is
closely related to the habitat area A. Wissel et al. (1994) found that
y A b T B ⋅ = = for 0<v²<2, and
(2)
) ln(A b T B ⋅ ′ = = for v²≥ 2.
with y=2/v
2-1. The quantity v is the coefficient of variation in population growth and b and b’
are some proportionality factors. The variation in population growth depends on the variability
of the environment and the extent to which it affects the population. Therefore, v is also
denoted as environmental variability – a parameter which depends on the species and quality
of the habitat. As a general rule, the lower the habitat quality, the higher the environmental
variability v.6
Equations (1) and (2) provide some plausible bound on a large range of possible benefit
functions as they focus on species richness and individual species as well as habitat quality. In
both equations benefits are related to area via a power law, with the exception of v²≥ 2.
However, the logarithmic function ln(A) is very similar to Eq. (1) with z=0.15, and we found
that the logarithmic function leads to similar results to those for z=0.15. For this reason, in the
following we consider only Eq. (1) with various z (cf. Fig.1).
Below we assume that initially a region contains habitat of area A0 corresponding to an initial
benefit of
z A B 0 0 ⋅ = α (3)
If habitat area is increased by an amount of ∆ A to a value of A=A0+∆ A the benefit increases by
[] 1 ) ' 1 ( ) ( 0 0 0 0 − ∆ + ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ − ∆ + ⋅ = − = ∆
z z z z A A A A A B B B α α α (4)
where ∆ A’=∆ A/A0 is the increase in area scaled in units of the initial habitat area. Without loss
of generality, we set the constant  1 0 = ⋅
z A α  and write
1 ) ' 1 ( − ∆ + = ∆
z A B (5)
Fig.1 shows ∆ B for a range of different z.
Figure 1: Increase in benefit ∆ B as a function of habitat area increase ∆ A’ for various z (from
bottom to top: 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 1, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7, 2).
It illustrates that functions with a rather small z (z<1) imply that the larger the habitat, the





contrast, a comparatively large z ( z>1) leads to increasing marginal benefits, and so
cumulative effects are observed.































With regard to the cost function we assume linearly increasing marginal costs c with an
increase in area (∆ A) where biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures are being carried out
A e c dA dC c ∆ ⋅ + = = 0 /. ( 6 )
The slope of the increase in marginal cost is given by e. The total costs C of carrying out
biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures in an area ∆ A are then given by the integral of Eq.
(6):
. ) ( 2 /
2
0 A e A c C ∆ ⋅ + ∆ ⋅ = (7)















A A c C (8)
A value of e=0 represents constant marginal costs; a value of e=c0/A0 means that an increase in
habitat area by an amount of A0 increases marginal costs by c0, which is regarded as a
plausible maximum for the value of e.
3. The model
The purpose of the model is to show the circumstances under which allocational efficiency
losses of spatially homogeneous compensation payments for biodiversity-enhancing land-use
measures are particularly high compared to spatially differentiated compensation payments
and compensation payments for results. For this aim a model with two regions (1 and 2) is
developed with different cost and benefit functions. Costs are assumed to differ with respect
to the slope of the marginal cost function, e, and benefits with respect to the parameter
indicating the type of species respectively habitat quality, z. These are the only differences
between the two regions. The variables are respectively denoted as e1, e2, z1 and z2 for regions
1 and 2.
Total benefit increase ∆ Btot is given by
2 1 tot B B B ∆ + ∆ = ∆ (9)
with ∆ B1 and ∆ B2 measuring the increase in benefit in regions 1 and 2, respectively, as derived
from the benefit function (Eq. 1). In Eq. (9) we assume that the benefits in the two regions are
additive. For instance, the persistence of a species for 400 years in only one region (where, for8
instance, its presence can be enjoyed by N people over 400 years) is valued equal to the
persistence of the same species for 200 years in each of the two regions (where – if the two
regions have equal numbers of inhabitants – 2N people can enjoy the species’ presence over
200 years). This appears to be a plausible model even though other, more complicated ways of
combining the two regional benefit functions are conceivable.
Total costs, Ctot,
2 1 tot C C C + = (10)
are the sum of costs in regions 1 and 2, C1, and C2, respectively. We assume that biodiversity-
enhancing land-use measures are allocated via the instrument of compensation payments.
Here for each region (i=1,2) a payment pi  is offered for carrying out such measures and
increasing the habitat area by ∆ Ai. We assume that biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures
will be carried out and habitat area will increase as long as compensation payments are higher
than or equal to the corresponding marginal costs pi≥ ci. Thus, from Eq. (6) it follows that a







= ∆  ( i=1,2) (11)
To determine allocational efficiency losses of homogeneous compensation payments, in a first
step we calculate the efficient total payments p1 and p2 (which do not necessarily have to be
equal) as functions of the total costs Ctot. The payments are determined through the
optimisation problem
Btot → max under the constraint
2 1 tot C C C + = and  Ci≥ 0 (i=1,2). (12)
Problems of this structure are usually solved analytically by applying Lagrange maximisation.
However, if the marginal benefits increase (zi>1), the procedure is not always able to find the
global maximum and therefore we solve the problem numerically. For each level of total costs
Ctot we vary a variable q from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.01 and calculate C1=qCtot and C2=(1-
q)Ctot, which allows a systematic scan of the different options for allocating Ctot. For each
value of q the total benefit ∆ Btot is determined and the maximum recorded. The efficient ∆ Ai
and pi follow directly from Eqs. (8) and (11). In this way, all quantities are determined as
functions of Ctot.9
In the second step we analyse the benefit obtained from homogeneous payments and compare
it to that obtained by the efficient payments above. For a given homogeneous payment
p=p1=p2, we calculate the corresponding increases in habitat area ∆ Ai via Eq. (11), from this
the corresponding costs Ci via Eq. (8), and the benefits via Eq. (5). Total benefit and total
costs follow from Eqs. (9) and (10). The total benefit is compared to the efficient total benefit
corresponding to the same total costs, as determined in the first step.
The ratio between the ‘homogeneous’ and the efficient total benefits is a measure of the
allocational efficiency loss of the homogeneous compensation payments and is determined as
a function of total costs.
4. Model analysis
The model is analysed in two steps. In the first step we explore the general behaviour of the
model and consider different preliminary scenarios, each being defined by the benefit and cost
structure in region 1. The corresponding parameters z1 and e1 assume different values between
0.2 and 3 (i.e. strongly decreasing and increasing marginal benefits) and between 0.05c0/A0
and 0.95c0/A0 (i.e., weakly and strongly increasing marginal costs), respectively. The
parameters for region 2 (z2 and e2) are varied from the values of z1 and e1 in increments of 0.1
and 0.05c0/A0, respectively.
Total costs Ctot range from 2c0A0 to 125c0A0. Values below 2c0A0 lead only to small efficiency
losses, regardless of the other model parameters. A value of 125c0A0 represents the costs
arising from multiplying the habitat area in region 1 by a factor of 125, and is regarded as an
upper plausible bound. Although in principle each value of Ctot leads to a different model
result, preliminary analyses of the model revealed that the efficiency changes only slowly with
total costs. Therefore we distinguish among three cost ranges: small (Ctot/c0A0 = 2-8), medium
(8–30), and large (30–125) costs. For each range the efficiency is calculated for all cost values
included and an average is taken. This results in three values for efficiency for each
combination of z1, z2, e1 and e2: one for small, one for medium and one for large costs.
Based on the results of this first step, in the second step we form five main scenarios which
encompass most of the model’s behaviour. A main scenario is defined by the combination of






In each scenario, e1 and e2, which determine the cost functions in the two regions, are varied
systematically between 0.05c0/A0 and 0.95c0/A0 in increments of 0.05c0/A0.
5. Results
Fig. 2 shows the efficiency of the instrument for one of the preliminary scenarios and two cost
levels.
Figure 2: Efficiency of the homogeneous instrument (white=100%; black=0%) relative to the
spatially differentiated instrument as a function of the benefit (z2) and cost functions (e2) in
region 2. Marginal costs in region 2 (e2) are scaled in units of c0/A0. The benefit and cost
functions in region 1 are fixed at z1=0.3 and e2=0.15c0/A0. Total costs are low (left figure) and
high (right figure).
The following observations are of interest:
•   The efficiency losses become higher when the differences between z1=0.3 and z2
increase.
•   The efficiency losses can reach almost 100% (see also Fig. 5).
•   The level of total costs seems to have little influence on the model results.
We also found in the first step that the qualitative behaviour of the model depends mainly on
two conditions:
1.  Whether the benefit functions in both regions are identical (z1=z2)
2.  How many of the two benefit functions are concave

























Combinations of all possible answers to the two questions are encompassed in the five
scenarios  S1–S5. Figure 3 shows the efficiency for the first scenario (z1=0.3,  z2=0.7) as a
function of the increase in marginal costs in the two regions (e1 and e2).
Figure 3: Efficiency of the homogeneous instrument (white=100%; black=0%) relative to the
spatially differentiated instrument as a function of the cost functions e1 and e2. Marginal costs
e1 and e2 are scaled in units of c0/A0. The benefit functions are fixed at z1=0.3 and z2=0.7.
Total costs are high.
It can be seen that the efficiency losses are minimal when e1>>e2 and maximal when e1<<e2.
This is plausible. In the former case the cost structure leads to more of the biodiversity-
enhancing land-use measures being allocated in region 2. This region provides the higher
benefit and thus allocation is efficient. In the latter case the biodiversity-enhancing land-use
measures are concentrated in region 1 with low benefit, leading to an inefficient allocation.
The results for the second scenario (z1=z2=0.5) are shown in Fig. 4.
Figure 4: Same as Fig. 3, but with z1=z2=0.5.
Naturally, the instrument is efficient if the cost structures of the two regions are identical
(e1=e2) because they lead to an even allocation of biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures.
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Due to the concavity of both benefit functions (with equally decreasing marginal costs) this
even allocation leads to maximum total benefit. However, even if e1≠ e2 the efficiency losses
are only small. This can be seen by exploring how an inhomogeneous instrument could
improve the efficiency. Assume, without loss of generality, e1>e2. If the payments in both
regions are equal, the allocation of biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures and area is
concentrated in region 2, leading to a misallocation from the point of view of the benefit
functions. Now consider two alternatives: increasing the payment in region 1 relative to that in
region 2, or doing the opposite. In the first case, p1>p2, the allocation of the total area would
become more uniform, but due to the larger e1 less area could be allocated in total. Altogether
the net advantage of the inhomogeneous instrument would be only moderate. In the second
case, p1<p2, more area could be allocated for the same total costs, but it would be allocated
exclusively in region 1, which would be inefficient due to the concavity of the benefit
functions. Altogether, the homogeneous instrument is relatively efficient if the benefit
functions are equal and concave, regardless of the shape of the cost functions.
Figure 5 with z1=0.3 and z2=1.7 (scenario S3) looks very similar to Figure 3, except that the
efficiency losses are much larger and can reach almost 100%.
Figure 5: Same as Fig. 3, but with z2=1.7.
Alongside the result that increasing difference in the benefit functions increases efficiency
losses, this indicates that if one of the benefit functions is concave, it makes no qualitative
difference whether the other one is concave or convex.
The efficient allocation changes considerably when both benefit functions are convex. First
we consider scenario S4, where both benefit functions are identical (z1=1.3 and z2=1.7: Fig. 6).
Figure 6: Same as Fig. 3, but with z1=1.3 and z2=1.7.
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Similar to Figs. 3 and 5, low efficiency losses are observed when the marginal costs in region
2 with the higher marginal benefit are smaller than those in region 1 (e1>>e2). In contrast to
Figs. 3 and 5, however, small efficiency losses are also observed in the opposite case, i.e.
when the marginal costs in region 2 are much higher than in region 1 (e1<<e2).
To understand this unexpected result for e1<<e2, consider two alternatives to the homogeneous
instrument and see if they lead to higher benefits: high payments in region 1 with low
payments in region 2, and vice versa. In the first case, p1>p2, a much greater area would be
obtained than with the homogeneous instrument due to the low costs of land in region 1.
However, this area would be relatively useless from an ecological angle due to the
comparatively low benefits (z1<z2). This problem could be fixed in the second case, p1<p2,
where a larger proportion of total area is allocated in region 2. However, due to the high costs
in region 2, the total area would be smaller than in the first case, so nothing would be
achieved.
All in all we are confronted with a choice between two evils: either we allocate biodiversity-
enhancing land-use measures in line with the cost structure (e1<<e2) but ‘against’ the benefit
structure (z1<z2) (first case), or we allocate them in line with the benefit structure but ‘against’
the cost structure. This means that (i) the maximum benefits that can be obtained under
efficient allocation are small, and (ii) the benefit is comparatively insensitive to the (relative)
allocation of the biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures in regions 1 and 2.
One may well ask why such a result only appears when both benefit functions are convex. The
answer is that here the marginal benefits increase in both benefit functions, which means that
even if the allocation of area is concentrated in the region with the lower z, a sufficient
increase in costs can achieve any desired benefit. While the efficiency loses are dramatic when
biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures are allocated to a region with the most strongly
large













decreasing marginal benefits (region 1 in scenarios S1 and S2; Figs. 3 and 5), the allocation of
biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures to the region with the less strongly increasing
marginal costs is less adverse.
The highest efficiency losses in Scenario 4 are observed when both cost functions are equal,
especially when marginal costs only increase slowly (e1≈ e2<<c0/A0). Here the homogeneous
instrument leads to the even allocation of biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures, while
due to the strongly increasing marginal benefit in region 2 (z2=1.7) this region should be
preferred.
This effect is slightly less severe when marginal costs sharply increase (e1=e2≈ c0/A0) because
the homogeneous allocation of costs becomes more advantageous (cf. Drechsler and Wätzold
2001) as a greater total area can be obtained for the given total costs. This fact partly overrules
the call of the benefit functions for inhomogeneous allocation and consequently, efficiency
losses are lower than in the case of e1≈ e2<<c0/A0.
Altogether, in this scenario the efficiency losses obtained by the homogeneous instrument are
small, as long as the cost functions differ strongly between the two regions.
Lastly we consider scenario S5, where both benefit functions are convex and identical
(z1=z2=1.5) (Fig. 7). It is shaped by a ‘battle’ between cost structure and benefit structure. As
the marginal benefits increase in both regions equally, an inhomogeneous allocation of the
costs – favouring either region 1 or 2 – is efficient from a benefit point of view. Such
inhomogeneous allocation of total costs is achieved by homogeneous payments when the cost
functions strongly differ. Consequently, the homogeneous instrument ought to be inefficient if
the cost functions are similar (e1≈ e2). Indeed, there are small efficiency losses if e1≈ e2<<c0/A0.
But why is the homogeneous instrument efficient again when e1≈ e2 approach c0? Here the cost
structure overrules the benefit structure and as already mentioned in the discussion of Fig. 6,
increasing marginal costs call for the homogeneous allocation of biodiversity-enhancing land-
use measures and thus boost the efficiency of the homogeneous instrument.15
Figure 7: Same as Fig. 3, but with z1= z2=1.5.
To provide an overview the results for the five scenarios are summarised in Table 1.


















No yes no no yes
e1>>e2 ++ / - + / -- -
e1<<e2 -- +/- --- - -
e1 ≈  e2 << c0/A0 - + -- --- +/-
e1 ≈  e2 ≈  c0/A0. - + -- -- +
+ : efficient (95-100%), - : little efficiency losses (80-95%) -- : medium efficiency losses (40-80%),
 --- : high efficiency losses (0-40%); percentages indicate the degree of efficiency of
homogeneous payments relative to efficient inhomogeneous payments.
6. Discussion
We investigated the efficiency of homogeneous compensation payments when costs have to
be allocated between two regions which differ in their cost and benefit functions. In the
mathematical model we analysed, marginal costs may increase strongly or slowly and the
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benefit functions may be concave, convex or linear. Irrespective of the shape of the cost and
benefit functions, the amount of biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures to be allocated had
little effect on the efficiency of the homogeneous payments.
To interpret the results of the preceding section in a practical way, we should briefly recall the
ecological meaning of z. In the presentation of the model we outlined that concave benefit
functions describe a situation of saturating benefits which applies when the benefit is
proportional to species richness or when the objective is to increase the lifetime of an
individual species which is subject to high environmental variation and/or lives in a habitat of
poor quality. By contrast, convex benefit functions describe the situation observed in the
vicinity of an ecological threshold and are likely to apply when a species is subject to low
environmental variation and/or inhabits high quality habitat.
The results clearly indicate that inefficiencies through homogeneous payments may be
substantial. Within the framework of the model, allocational efficiency losses were close to
100% under certain conditions. This suggests that the regulator ought to take potential
allocational efficiency losses into account when deciding whether to implement spatially
homogeneous or differentiated payments for biodiversity-enhancing land use measures, or
whether to implement compensation payments for measures or for results.
We found that the qualitative behaviour of the model strongly depends on whether both
benefit functions are convex (scenarios S4–S5 in Table 1) or not (scenarios S1–S3).
In the latter case the results were as expected: Efficiency losses are negligible if either both
benefit functions are identical/similar, regardless of the cost functions (scenario S2), or if
benefit and cost functions ‘agree’, i.e. if the marginal costs are higher in the region with the
lower benefit (e1>>e2). In the other cases the efficiency losses were higher, especially if
benefit and cost functions strongly ‘disagreed’, i.e. if the marginal costs were higher in the
region with the higher benefit (e2>>e1 in scenarios S1 and S3).
Totally different results are obtained when both benefit functions are convex (S4-S5). Here the
two key questions are whether the two cost functions are similar/identical, and whether the
two benefit functions are similar/identical. If the cost functions in the two scenarios are
strongly dissimilar, then efficiency losses are small, regardless of whether cost and benefit
functions ‘agree’ or not (i.e. whether e1>>e2 and e2>>e1). If the two cost functions are
identical/similar (e1≈ e2), efficiency losses strongly depend on whether the benefit functions are17
identical/similar, as well. If the benefit functions are identical/similar (S5), efficiency losses
are negligible; if they are dissimilar, efficiency losses are substantial (S4).
In this model, an assumption has been employed that may be interesting to modify in future
research. We assumed that the benefits in the two regions are additive (see Eq. 9). From the
ecological viewpoint this implies that the populations in the two regions are independent. This
would not be valid if for example there was interaction (an exchange of individuals) between
the populations of the two regions. Then the extinction of the population in one region could
be balanced through recolonisation from the other region. The expected lifetime of this
‘metapopulation’ (e.g. Hanski 1999) would be larger than the sum of the expected lifetimes of
the populations in the two separate regions.
Future research may also attempt to assess the empirical relevance of the problem tackled in
this paper on a conceptual level. Kolstad (1986) empirically examined efficiency losses from
spatially uniform economic instruments (price or quantity controls) for regulating air
pollution, and found that efficiency losses may be significant. What would be the results of
studies addressing the same question for compensation payments aimed at protecting
biodiversity? It should be relatively easy to answer this question for compensation
programmes for species protection. Given spatially differentiated data on economic costs and
ecological benefits (which may be gained through species-specific ecological simulation
models; see for example Burgman et al. 1993, Hanski 1999, Johst et al. 2001), efficiency
losses may be calculated using methods of numerical optimisation.
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